Myanmar’s Observations on draft resolution (A/HRC/61/L.24.Rev.1) entitled “Situation of human rights in Myanmar” to be submitted by the EU at the 61st Human Rights Council Session

30 March 2026

1.         As a matter of principle, Myanmar always opposes country-specific resolutions and their follow-up mechanisms. The following observations are prepared for the benefit of member states to have a balanced view. Since the resolution has been tabled by the European Union for over thirty years, Myanmar only includes its observations on new elements, and it does not mean that Myanmar agrees with the remaining ones.

2.         Reference is made to PP3 and OP1. The Government ended the nationwide State of Emergency on 31 July 2025, after fulfilling its national duties for four years and six months. The State Administration Council (SAC) was dissolved and returned the state responsibilities to the National Defence and Security Council. At the same time, due to ongoing security challenges, the Government placed 63 townships under a state of emergency for limited periods to maintain stability and ensure public security. The paragraphs represent distorted information.

3.         Reference is made to PP5, PP6, PP11, OP10(a), OP11(a), OP11(d).  Although the draft tries to streamline, duplicated elements remain, with the attempt to discredit the Government of Myanmar, the actions of armed terrorists responsible for horrific atrocities against civilians and the lawful actions of security forces in response cannot be equated. The penholder totally ignores the violence committed by terrorist groups, which have claimed the lives of 9,513 innocent civilians, including 374 children, 1,306 administrative staff, 123 teachers, and 25 healthcare workers along with the sabotage of 1,317 roads and bridges, 82 hospitals and dispensaries, and 843 schools and educational buildings.

4.         Reference is made to PP7, PP8, PP20, PP22, PP43, OP15(g), OP16(a), OP16(b) and OP16(c). Myanmar reaffirms its commitment to receive the verified displaced persons once the security and stability in northern Rakhine are restored. However, Myanmar does not recognize the term “Rohingya,” which has never existed in legal and historical records of Myanmar. As of 31 January 2026, out of 828,824 individuals provided by Bangladesh in six batches for repatriation, Myanmar has verified 365,730 individuals. Myanmar found that 262,239 individuals were former residents in Rakhine State, 3,819 individuals were found to have been involved in terrorist acts, and the data of 99,672 individuals could not be verified. The repatriation process is hindered by terrorist acts of AA and ARSA, aka Aqamul Mujahideen. While the Organization of Islamic Cooperation tables a separate resolution in connection with the displaced persons from Rakhine State, the elements contained in the paragraphs clearly demonstrate the multiplication and duplication of work.

5.         Reference is made to PP 12 and OP10(e). Bylaws for the People’s Military Service Law of 2010 were enacted on 23 January 2025, and since the notification of the effectiveness of the People’s Military Service Law of 2010 on 10 February 2024, the information relating to the recruitment has been publicly announced. While anyone who has knowledge of forced recruitment can file a complaint to the Central Body for Summoning People’s Military Servants, the elements contained in the paragraphs are sweeping allegations from unfounded sources.  

6.         Reference is made to PP17, OP 2(b). In connection with Myanmar’s recent elections, elements contained in the paragraphs are clearly prejudiced. The multiparty democratic general elections, which were held in three phases from 28 December 2025 to 25 January 2026, covered 80 percent of the country.  Out of over 24.22 million eligible voters nationwide, a total of 13.14 million cast their votes in a free, fair, and transparent election, representing a 54.22 per cent turnout. A total of 51 international observers from ten countries and two international organizations, together with 139 diplomatic observers from 14 countries, conducted electoral observation and monitoring.  Furthermore, over 1,100 domestic and over 200 international journalists were granted media access. The observers witnessed that the elections were held in a peaceful and orderly manner, in contrast to the assertions in the paragraphs. More importantly, the elections and political process in Myanmar are solely internal affairs of a sovereign country.

7.         Reference is made to PP19. Myanmar has been working to tackle the issue of transnational crime, which in nature needs close cooperation among the countries. Blaming Myanmar will not help address the issue. Between 30 January 2025 and 29 March 2026, a total of 13,336 foreign nationals who were involved in or victims of the online scam were deported to their respective countries. It should be noted that almost all of them, or 99.5 percent of them, illegally entered Myanmar by crossing the border.

8.         Reference is made to PP26, PP31, PP32, PP33, PP35, OP15(f), OP24 to OP36. These paragraphs show the extent of proliferation of duplicated mechanisms selectively targeting Myanmar. Without the consent of the country concerned, the work of the mechanisms is only meant to transform anti-government narratives into UN documents, contributing nothing to the promotion and protection of human rights on the ground. These mechanisms in total have called for approximately 22 million USD every year, including the so-called IIMM, which asked for over 19 million USD per year. In times of liquidity crisis and reviewing the rationalization and efficiency of the human rights mechanisms, such proliferation of unhelpful, costly mechanisms demands their total elimination.

9.         Reference is made to PP 27 and PP 29. Myanmar has the willingness, ability, and functioning national institutions to address the alleged violations; it does not accept any outside measures under the pretext of accountability.

10.       Reference is made to PP14, OP2(j), OP 10(g) and OP11(f). Myanmar has been working with the humanitarian organizations and issuing entry visas to international staff. No humanitarian worker is harmed by the security forces. In 2025, Myanmar granted visas to nearly 500 individuals from UN agencies, ICRC, INGOs, and other national societies. Between February 2021 and December 2025, the Government facilitated travel access for UN agencies and international non-governmental organizations over 2,400 times. From January to December 2025, over 100 visits of the diplomats to different parts of the country were also facilitated. Access has been granted to the UN personnel as well as non-governmental organizations so long as the security situation allows. It is, therefore, unnecessary and unacceptable to create other channels. In light of principles of state sovereignty, coordination, and aid effectiveness, humanitarian assistance is most effective, accountable, and sustainable when delivered in coordination with national institutions and through established administrative mechanisms, rather than through parallel or unregulated channels.  In connection with the earthquake response, between 28 March 2025 and 8 May 2025, Myanmar welcomed 1,935 search and rescue personnel as well as 845 healthcare professionals and doctors from 25 countries, including Belarus, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Turkiye, and the UAE. 

11.       Reference is made to PP34. The appointment in Myanmar is UN Resident Coordinator ad interim.

12.       Reference is made to OP15(h). The paragraph is illogical since there is no single report of reprisals, intimidation or attack whatsoever against the diplomatic corps, as well as other categories mentioned in the paragraph.

13.       Reference is made to OP10(f) and OP15(k). These paragraphs deserve the attention of the international community as they show the proliferation of the same duplicated work among the different agencies of the United Nations system, in addition to the purview of the Human Rights Council. Similar elements can be found in the ILO documents against Myanmar. It is also the case for PP9 and OP11(b) in connection with the alleged grave violations against children, and Myanmar was listed in the annex of the UN Secretary-General’s Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict. It is, in fact, no surprise to such orchestrated moves, since the manipulators of the politicized mandates are the same actors.

14.       Reference is made to OP 11(c). The current risks to civilians caused by landmines result from improvised mines recklessly deployed by armed insurgent groups and PDF terrorists. The security forces are actively assisting displaced civilians to return to their homes and resettle safely while collaborating with civil administrative departments to provide mine risk education. The Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement provided financial assistance, a total of 3.3 million Kyats, to 66 injured persons from 43 land mine incidents in five States and Regions from April to December 2025.

15.       Reference is made to PP37, OP7 and OP22. The paragraphs provoke member states to impose unilateral coercive measures against Myanmar contrary to international law and the UN Charter. Imposing sanctions will only disproportionately harm the public overall, including the vulnerable groups, which is a violation of human rights. 

16.       Reference is made to OP24, OP25, and OP26. Myanmar opposes the extension of the unhelpful mandate of the so-called Special Rapporteur, which has lasted several decades without any contribution to the promotion and protection of human rights in Myanmar, but has created polarizations, divisions, hatred and mistrust among the population of Myanmar.

17.       Reference is made to OP34. The Britain-initiated Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) included several intrusive elements on Myanmar’s internal affairs that contravene the principles and purposes of the United Nations. Moreover, the resolution constitutes human rights-related matters that fall outside the purview of the Security Council’s mandate. Domestic mechanisms and institutions remain the primary avenue for addressing the challenges.

18.       In light of the above explanations and its consistent opposition against the country-specific resolutions, Myanmar rejects the draft resolution contained in A/HRC/61/L.24/Rev.1 as a whole.

Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar

Geneva

30 March 2026